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INTRODUCTION
Within the past two decades, there has been a significant
increase in the number of international investment
agreements providing for arbitration through the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). 1 This substantial growth in arbitration for
investor-state disputes has led to concerns that the
international investment system is business-biased and
1. For a description of the Centre and the investor-state dispute process,
see Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) (Jan. 20, 2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Documents/ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20ENGLISH
.pdf [hereinafter Background information on ICSID].
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flawed. 2 Many powerful global corporations have been accused
of taking advantage of developing countries through the
international investment regime. 3 Developing countries agree
to enter into investment agreements with private investors
from wealthier nations in an effort to encourage foreign
investment and ideally enhance economic development. 4
However, critics claim that private investors utilize their
superior bargaining power to negotiate unequal international
investment treaties that favor the rights of investors. 5 These
controversial international investment agreements protect the
foreign investment and allegedly afford investors the power to
sue governments if policy changes are deemed to negatively
affect investors’ profits. 6 Powerful corporate investors are then
able to seek enforcement of these rights and protections
through international arbitration tribunals, specifically
ICSID. 7 There are growing concerns that ICSID prioritizes the
rights and interests of corporate investors 8 at the expense of
the social and environmental goals of the national
governments and sovereign states. 9
This comment will examine the inherent flaws within the
current international investment process. First, this comment
will present the background information on the foreign direct
investment process; in general, the development of investment
agreements and the shortcomings of the various alternative
investment dispute mechanisms. This comment will describe
the structure and purpose of ICSID as an organization
established under the World Bank. Next, it will analyze the
legal problems arising from the foreign investment process
2. PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW
LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION BOOM, 7 (Helen Burley ed., Corporate Eur. Observatory and the
Transnational Inst. 2012).
3. Id.
4. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and
Geneva, Course on Dispute Settlement: International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232, Module 2.1 (Oct. 3, 2003) (by
Christoph
Schreuer),
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
edmmisc232overview_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Course] (discussing the
significance of foreign investment for development).
5. SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR
RULE 2 (Inst. for Policy Studies & Food and Water Watch eds., 2007).
6. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 7.
7. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 10.
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today, which arguably favors corporate investors.
This
discussion will include criticism on the unequal international
investment regime beginning with the creation of lopsided
investment agreements, which are then enforced by a partial
arbitration process. Finally, this comment will propose
possible improvements for the international investment
process to eliminate bias and provide investors and host states
with a mutual confidence in ICSID as an impartial system for
the settlement of investment disputes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a process by which a
private company or entity invests in a business enterprise in
FDI
another country, typically a developing country. 10
potentially benefits both parties involved. While the investor
profits from the expanded market and production networks,
FDI also plays an important role for the developing country by
Foreign investment
enhancing economic development. 11
provides a developing country access to several options vital for
development, such as capital, financing and technology. 12
These options can contribute to the improvement of a host
country’s infrastructure, provide employment opportunities
and promote the welfare of their people. 13
Before the 1960s, foreign investors were forced to comply
with a variety of domestic government regulations to help
ensure that the investment provided benefits to the host
country. 14 For example, “foreign investors were subjected to . . .
regulations, such as tariff protection, domestic content
requirements, capital controls or controls on repatriation and
other rules . . . .” 15 Investors, opposed to these constraints that
protected the domestic industries, created international
10. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Omar E. García-Bolívar, Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic
Development Should be the Core Element, 2 INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, April,
13, 2012 http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/defining-an-icsid-investment-whyeconomic-development-should-be-the-core-element/ (explaining the intentions of
states in international investment law).
14. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 4.
15. Id.
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investment agreements to heighten the protections of their
investment to ultimately maximize their profit. 16
B. International Investment Agreements
Today, international investment agreements, specifically
either bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or free trade
agreements (FTAs), predominantly govern foreign direct
investments in developing countries. BITs are agreements
between states that determine the terms and conditions for
private foreign investors in the jurisdiction of another
country. 17 FTAs, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Central America Free Trade Agreement,
are agreements that include chapters that provide for investor
protections. 18 FTAs can be bilateral agreements, between two
states, or multilateral agreements, between more than two
states. 19
International investment agreements began to emerge in
the 1960s to provide greater protection for private investments
under international law. 20 “The focus of the initial period of
growth of investment treaties was singular: the protection of
investor rights in foreign states.” 21 Investors consider various
factors when pursuing an overseas investment including “the
host country’s reputation, the profitability of a venture, low
labor costs, availability of natural resources, tax advantages,
etc.” 22 In addition to these factors, potential host countries
offer international legal guarantees to investors through
international investment agreements such BITs and FTAs. 23
These agreements typically grant investors broad privileges by
including provisions that govern four substantive areas: FDI
admission, “fair and equitable treatment” to an investment,

16. Id.
17. See Zachery Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing
for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008).
18. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3.
19. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 1.
20. Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role
in Sustainable Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 523 (2013).
21. Id. at 524.
22. Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime
and Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953,
957 (2007).
23. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 5–6.
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adequate compensation for expropriation, and the settlement
of disputes in international tribunals. 24
By signing a BIT or FTA, the host government makes a
credible commitment to treat foreign investors fairly. The
enhanced security of a BIT and FTA is helpful as “a
‘confidence-building’ measure that sends a green light to the
private investment community.” 25 Accordingly, governments
with little credibility will sign BITs to give them a competitive
advantage by reducing the risk of investing. Therefore,
developing countries competing for foreign capital have a
strong incentive to enter into foreign investment agreements. 26
C. Alternative Methods of Investment Dispute Settlement
An important aspect of the legal protection of foreign
investments is the settlement of disputes between host states
and foreign investors. 27 Therefore, when a dispute arises, a
mechanism providing for an impartial and effective dispute
settlement is a necessary element to protect both parties’
rights. 28 Until the creation of ICSID, the following methods
available for the settlement of investment disputes were
arguably inadequate. 29
1. Domestic Court of Host State
In the absence of other previously agreed upon
arrangements for the settlement of the investment dispute, the
host state’s domestic courts will commonly be employed to
However, from the investor’s
resolve the dispute. 30
24. See ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3. The terms “Fair and
Equitable Treatment” are not defined and are thus subjective, providing
arbitrators with broad discretion to interpret the meaning. Additionally,
provisions granting adequate compensation if an investment is expropriated
protects investors from either a physical taking of property, as well as
government actions and regulations that reduce the value of a foreign
investment.
25. Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of
the Neoliberal Contagion, 7 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 85, 107 (1999)(quoting Jeswald W.
Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24:3 THE INT’L LAWYER
655, 661 (1990)).
26. Chung, supra note 22, at 957.
27. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7.
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perspective, investment dispute settlement in the host state’s
court is disadvantageous. First, investors claim that the host
states’ courts lack impartiality because they fail to offer
sufficient guarantees to protect the foreign investor. 31 For
example, domestic courts are bound by domestic law.32
Accordingly, the domestic law of the host state will be applied
even if the investor’s rights would otherwise be protected
under international law. 33 Also, investors claim that the
regular domestic courts are unable to provide the advanced
technical expertise required for the equitable resolution of
complex international investment disputes. 34
2. Domestic Court of Other State
Investment disputes can also potentially be settled in
domestic courts of the investor’s states. 35 Parties can agree to
a choice of forum clause pointing to either the investor’s
domestic court or the court of a third state. 36 However, this
type of dispute settlement is not usually a realistic option. 37
Regardless of an agreed upon choice of forum clause, the
domestic courts of other states typically lack territorial
jurisdiction over the investment operations; “sovereign
immunity or other judicial doctrines will usually make such
proceedings impossible.” 38
3. Diplomatic Protection
Diplomatic protection is another method used in the
settlement of investment disputes. Because foreign investors
regard the host state’s domestic court as inadequate for the
settlement of the investor-state dispute, foreign investors can
rely on their home country to exercise diplomatic protection. 39
Diplomatic protection is a means for the investor’s home state
to take action against the host state in pursuit of the investor’s
claim. 40 However, this method of dispute resolution also has
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 7.
Id.
Contra id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 7.
Id.
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several disadvantages. 41
First, diplomatic protection is
discretionary and the investor does not have an automatic
right to employ this method of resolution. 42 Secondly, the
investor is required to have exhausted all local remedies in the
host state without a satisfactory result before this process is
even a possibility. 43 This prerequisite is intended to reduce the
number of international claims and to avoid the developed
country’s involvement by providing the host country an
opportunity to remedy the foreign investor’s claims. 44
Additionally, diplomatic protection can potentially affect
the political relations between the two countries involved in
the dispute. 45 For example, some developed countries have
been accused of exercising diplomatic protection, specifically
by applying political pressure and threatening economic
boycotts, before the exhaustion of local remedies. 46 Diplomatic
protection, therefore, changes the investor-state dispute to a
political dispute between the host country and the home
country, and may result in tense international relations. 47
4. Ad Hoc Arbitration
Another alternative for investment dispute settlement is
ad hoc arbitration between the host state and the foreign
investor. 48 Ad hoc arbitration is a form of arbitration that is
not supported by a particular arbitration institution. 49 While
ad hoc arbitration permits the parties to tailor the arbitration
process to the specific facts of their dispute, ad hoc arbitration
lacks institutional support, which creates a number of
procedural disadvantages and inefficiencies. 50 For example,
once the parties have agreed on ad hoc arbitration, they are
required to create an arbitration agreement that regulates
several procedural issues. 51 The parties must agree on the
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Chen Huiping, The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Where
to Go in the 21st Century?, 9 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 467, 469 (2008).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 7.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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location and language of the arbitration, the applicable law,
and the selection of arbitrators. 52
As the shortcomings of the existing structures available
for the settlement of investment dispute became increasingly
apparent, the World Bank created an initiative in the 1960s to
provide an effective and impartial alternative for investment
dispute settlement between host states and foreign investors. 53
D. ICSID as an Investor-State Dispute Mechanism
1. World Bank’s Purpose and Structure
The primary purpose of the World Bank is to end poverty
and
encourage shared prosperity by “promot[ing]
environmental and social sustainability, and to pursue a
fiscally responsible development path.” 54 The Bank operates
as a form of democracy as the member nations are represented
in the Board of Executive Directors. 55 The president of the
World Bank is a citizen from the Bank’s largest shareholder
member and governs the five separate institutions currently
established under the Bank. 56 In 1966, the World Bank
created the independent international institution, the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, to provide facilities for the conciliation and
arbitration of international investment disputes. 57
2. Purpose of ICSID
ICSID’s founding documents reveal three main purposes
the institution seeks to achieve. 58 First, ICSID was established
to protect foreign investment through the facilitation of
Secondly, the ICSID
investment dispute settlement. 59
Convention seeks to promote investment flows to Third World
52. Id.
53. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 9.
54. See Corporate Responsibility, THE WORLD BANK (visited Mar. 2014),
https://crinfo.worldbank.org/wbcrinfo/node/6 (stating the World Bank’s mission is
to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity).
55. Jennifer N. Weidner, World Bank Study, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193,
193 (2001).
56. Id. at 197.
57. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 1.
58. See Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of
ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 357 (2006–2007).
59. Id. at 358.
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states. 60
According to the ICSID Report, guaranteeing
investment protection by providing a mechanism for investorstate arbitration “would provide additional inducement and
stimulate a larger flow of private international investment into
its territories, which is the primary purpose of the
Convention.” 61 Therefore, ICSID was established under the
belief that protecting foreign investors would facilitate
investment flows, and as a result, enhance economic
development in Third World countries. 62
Furthermore, ICSID’s third goal is to provide an
“atmosphere of mutual confidence” for investors and host
countries. 63 This third purpose incorporates both of the first
two purposes because “[t]he creation of an institution designed
to facilitate the settlement of disputes between States and
foreign investors can be a major step toward promoting an
atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus stimulating a larger
flow of private international capital into those countries which
wish to attract it.” 64
3. Evolution of ICSID
Although ICSID’s mechanisms were rarely employed for
the first thirty years of its existence, the Convention’s caseload
has increased dramatically in the last fifteen years. 65 This
increase is a result of the substantial growth of foreign
investments coupled with the rising number of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and other international investment
agreements providing for arbitration proceedings for the
investor-state dispute settlement. 66 International investment
agreements commonly protect investor’s rights by providing
access to direct remedies in international tribunals. 67 There
are several international tribunals and rules that can be
employed to resolve claims arising out of the investment, such
as the United Nations Commission on International Trade
60. Id.
61. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 5 I.L.M. 524
¶ 12 (Mar. 18, 1965) [hereinafter ICSID Report].
62. Odumosu, supra note 58, at 359.
63. Id.
64. ICSID Report, supra note 61, ¶ 9.
65. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3.
66. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 4.
67. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3.
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Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC). 68
Today, the majority of investment agreements provide for
ICSID arbitration, as ICSID was specifically established to
facilitate the arbitration of disputes between states and
investors. 69 As of June 2013, ICSID had registered a total of
433 cases under the ICSID Convention. 70 Over seventy percent
of cases established ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of consent
invoked by international investment agreements. 71
4. Structure of ICSID
The governing body of ICSID is the ICSID Administrative
Council. The Administrative Council is comprised of one
representative from each member state, with each
representative having equal voting powers. 72 As of December
31, 2014, the Administrative Council was comprised of
representatives from 150 Contracting States. 73 The chair of
the Administrative Council is the president of the World Bank
and has no vote. 74 The Administrative Council is responsible
for electing the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary
General, adopting the annual budget, adopting the rules and
regulations for the institution and the procedure for the
arbitration proceedings, and approving the annual report on
the
Centre’s
operation. 75
The ICSID Secretariat is comprised of a SecretaryGeneral, one or more Deputy Secretary-Generals, and staff. 76
The Secretariat is responsible for overseeing individual
disputes on a day-to-day basis, providing institutional support
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2013–2, at 23 (June 30,
2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/20122%20%20-%20English.pdf [hereinafter ICSID, Statistics 2013].
71. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 2. The remainder of
ICSID cases established jurisdiction on the basis of Investor-State dispute
settlement provisions in domestic investment legislation or contracts.
72. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, art. VII, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, available
at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
73. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 1.
74. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. V.
75. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. XI.
76. Id. art. IX.
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for the initiation and conduct of ICSID proceedings, assisting
in the constitution of conciliation commissions, arbitral
tribunals and ad hoc committees, and administering the
proceedings and finances of each case. 77
5. Choice of ICSID Dispute Settlement Methods
There are two possible methods of dispute settlement
provided by the ICSID Convention: conciliation and
arbitration. 78 Conciliation is designed to assist the parties in
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. 79 Both parties
must willingly agree to pursue this method of dispute
If the parties reach an agreement, the
resolution. 80
Commission creates a report noting the issues in the dispute
and records the parties’ agreed upon decision. 81 Conciliation is
considered to be a more informal and flexible approach, and
the report generated as a result of the conciliation is not
binding on the parties. 82
Arbitration, on the other hand, is a more formal process of
dispute resolution. 83 If the parties fail to reach an agreed
settlement, the tribunal determines an award that is binding
and enforceable on both parties. 84 The vast majority of cases
brought under the ICSID Convention use arbitration
proceedings. 85 In a case where the parties have submitted to
both conciliation and arbitration, the party initiating the
proceedings decides which method will be used. 86 That party
will typically choose arbitration, as this will ensure the efforts
and costs of the dispute settlement will result in a binding
decision. 87

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13.
Id.
Id.
ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. XXXIV.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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6. ICSID Arbitration
a. Proceedings
As mentioned above, ICSID specializes in the settlement
of investment disputes. Therefore, to be within ICSID’s
jurisdiction, there must first be a legal dispute arising directly
out of an investment. 88 While the ICSID Convention did not
define what constitutes an investment, many investment
agreements will provide a definition of investment. 89 Also, the
ICSID Convention does not contain any substantive rules but
instead offers a procedure for the settlement of investment
disputes. 90 Pursuant to the ICSID Convention, the tribunals
are to follow the law agreed upon by the parties. 91 However, in
the absence of an agreed choice of law, the Tribunal shall apply
the law of the host State, as well as any applicable
international law. 92 International law includes international
agreements, such as BITs and FTAs, and customary
international law. 93 Also, if authorized by both parties, a
tribunal has the authority to decide a case ex aequo et bono,
meaning “on the basis of equity rather than law.” 94
ICSID arbitration proceedings are initiated by the
submitting a Request for Arbitration to the Secretary-General
of ICSID. 95 The request describes the facts and issues of the
particular case. 96 The next step in the procedure is selecting
the arbitral tribunal. 97 Within sixty days after the tribunal has
been established, an initial session is held to discuss
preliminary questions of procedure. 98 The proceedings then
comprise of a written procedure, followed by an in-person oral
hearing where the parties present their case. 99 Subsequently,
the tribunal will deliberate and render an award. 100

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 14.
ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XLII.
Id.
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 14.
Id.
Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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b. Tribunal Selection
Independent
tribunals
decide
the
international
investment disputes under ICSID arbitration proceedings. 101
In most instances, the tribunals are comprised of one
arbitrator appointed by the investor, one arbitrator appointed
by the state, and one presiding arbitrator, or tribunal
president, appointed through the consent of both parties. 102
ICSID maintains a list of individuals who may be named as
arbitrators in ICSID proceedings known as the ICSID Panel of
Conciliators and of Arbitrators. 103
Each ICSID Member State may designate four arbitrators
to the Panel and the Chairman of the Administrative Council,
the president of the World Bank, may designate ten arbitrators
to the panel. 104 While this list provides a useful source from
which parties may select arbitrators, the parties are not
obligated to select an arbitrator from the list. 105 Parties are
free to appoint any person they deem suitable who is of “high
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law,
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to
exercise independent judgment” 106 to facilitate in the
resolution of the dispute. If the parties to a dispute fail to
appoint conciliators or arbitrators to a tribunal, the Chairman
of the Administrative Council has the authority to appoint
conciliators, arbitrators or ad hoc committee members for the
ICSID proceedings. 107
Before the arbitration proceedings commence, the ICSID
Arbitration Rules require each arbitrator to sign a declaration
acknowledging that the arbitrator “shall judge fairly as
between the parties, according to the applicable law . . . .”108
Also, each arbitrator is required to attach a written statement
of any past or present relationships with the parties and any
other circumstance that may cause doubt as to that particular

101. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XIII.
105. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 3.
106. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XIV(1).
107. Id. at art. XXXIX.
108. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, R.6(2) (Mar. 18,
1965), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/
CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules].
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arbitrator’s
reliability
for
independent
judgment. 109
Additionally, arbitrators have a continuing obligation to
investigate any conflict of interest that may arise throughout
the proceedings. 110 A party may propose to disqualify an
arbitrator on the grounds that the particular arbitrator lacks
the qualities required and therefore is ineligible for
appointment to the Tribunal. 111
c. Confidentiality
The ICSID Rules specifically provide for confidentiality
with regards to the proceedings. Each arbitrator is required to
sign a declaration that he will keep all information regarding
the arbitration proceedings and contents of any award
confidential. 112 Also, only the members of the Tribunal, the
parties, and the parties’ agents, counsel, witnesses and experts
may be present at the hearings. 113 In 2006, ICSID amended
the rules of the Convention to permit third parties to attend
oral hearings upon consent by both parties. 114 Lastly, only the
Tribunal is permitted to participate in the deliberations,
unless the Tribunal decides otherwise, and “the deliberations
of the Tribunal shall take place in private and remain
secret.” 115
Pursuant to the ICSID Convention, the tribunal is
prohibited from publishing the award without the consent of
the parties. 116 However, the Centre typically obtains the
consent of the parties for such publication. 117 The ICSID Rules
previously provided ICSID Tribunals with discretion to
publish excerpts of awards that revealed the Tribunal’s legal
reasoning behind their decision. 118 In an effort to increase
transparency, the 2006 amended rules now require ICSID to
“promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. LVII.
112. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 108, at R. 6(2).
113. Id. at R. 32.
114. Id.
115. Id. at R. 15(1).
116. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XLVIII(5).
117. ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID
Arbitration 8 (Discussion Paper, 2004), available at https://icsid.worldbank.
org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/Possible Improvements of the
Framework of ICSID Arbitration.pdf.
118. Id. at 8–9.
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reasoning of the Tribunal.” 119 Therefore, the 2006 amendments
make the reasoning behind the tribunal’s holding more
accessible to the public. 120 However, consent by both parties is
nonetheless still required for the publication of the award. 121
The ICSID Rules are silent regarding whether the parties
to a proceeding have an implied duty of confidentiality. 122 In
one dispute, the Tribunal held that “both parties should
refrain, in their own interest, from doing anything that could
aggravate or exacerbate the dispute.” 123 However, tribunals
have acknowledged that under the ICSID Rules, parties are
allowed to freely disseminate any information relevant to the
Accordingly, parties to
arbitration proceedings. 124
international arbitration will often contract for confidentiality
in investment agreements, thereby adding protections beyond
the rules of the arbitral tribunal. 125
d. Awards
Pursuant to Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, “[e]ach
party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the
award . . . .” 126 Therefore, ICSID awards are binding and final
and the award debtor is obligated to comply. 127 Pecuniary
obligations arising from awards are to be enforced like final
domestic judgments in all Member States of the Convention. 128
Accordingly, recognition and enforcement may be sought either
in the host state, in the investor’s state, or in any state that is
a party to the ICSID Convention. 129
The procedure for the enforcement and execution of the
award is “governed by the laws concerning the execution of
judgments in force in the State where such execution is

119. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 108, at R. 48(4).
120. Id.
121. ICSID Secretariat, supra note 117, at 8.
122. See generally ICSID Convention, supra note 70.
123. Amanda L. Norris & Katrina E. Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private
Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water War,
15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 31, 47 (2010) (quoting Margrete Stevens,
Confidentiality Revisited, NEWS FROM ICSID, Spring 2000, at 9).
124. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 48.
125. Id.
126. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. LIII(1).
127. Id.
128. Id. at art. LIV.
129. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 18.
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sought.” 130 ICSID awards are not subject to scrutiny by
domestic courts. 131 As a result, a domestic court is not
permitted to examine jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal,
procedure, or substantive validity of an award. 132
After an award is rendered, the parties may request an
interpretation, revision, or annulment of the award. 133 The
ICSID Convention offers its own system for review by which a
party may seek annulment of the award by an ad hoc
committee. 134 The ad hoc committee consists of three persons,
appointed by the Chairman of ICSID. 135 In accordance with
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, a party may request
annulment of the award only on the following conditions: (a)
the Tribunal was not properly constituted, (b) the Tribunal
manifestly exceeded its powers, (c) corruption by a Tribunal
member, (d) a serious departure from a fundamental rule or
procedure, or (e) the award did not state the reasons for the
decision. 136
If the ad hoc committee upholds the request for the
annulment, the original award is invalidated. 137 However, the
ad hoc committee does not have the authority to replace the
award with a new decision on the merits. 138 To receive a valid
award for that particular claim, the parties must request that
the dispute be submitted to a new tribunal. 139
II. LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT PROCESS
The substantial increase in the number of international
investment agreements has led to a growing concern the
international investment regime is adverse to developing
countries. Foreign direct investment is essential for enhancing
economic development in developing countries. 140 However, in
the competition to attract investment, developing countries are
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. LIV(3).
UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 18.
Id.
ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. L-LII.
ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 108, R. 52(1).
ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. LII(3).
Id. at art. LII(1).
ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. LII.
Id.
Id.
Odumosu, supra note 58, at 359.
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in a disadvantaged bargaining position during the investment
agreement negotiation process. 141 As a result of these unequal
investment agreements, developing countries are not receiving
the potential benefits of the foreign direct investment
process. 142
Additionally, foreign investors often request to include a
provision in the investment agreement stipulating that ICSID
shall govern the resolution of any dispute arising out of an
investment. 143 Because ICSID was established under the belief
that protecting foreign investors would facilitate investment
and ultimately enhance economic development in Third World
countries, there is a concern that ICSID dispute settlement
inequitably prioritizes the protection of investors’ rights
regardless of any potentially adverse consequences on the
developing country.
As developing countries begin to question the legitimacy
of the international investment process as a biased system
favoring investors, they will seek ways to avoid the
In 2012, Venezuela
international investment regime. 144
became the third country, following Ecuador and Bolivia, to
have denounced its membership from ICSID. 145 Venezuela’s
exit from ICSID signals the growing loss of faith in the system
and raises questions about the Convention’s legitimacy and
purpose to provide an unbiased investment dispute resolution
forum. 146 Accordingly, there are concerns “that other states
will follow suit, which could result in the collapse of the current
international investment system.” 147 Bolivia, Ecuador and
Venezuela’s withdrawal from ICSID demonstrates that
changes are imperative to prevent the current international
investment regime from potential collapse.

141. Chung, supra note 22, at 958.
142. Id.
143. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 2.
144. Chung, supra note 22, at 969.
145. Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and
Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 239, 241 (2012).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Criticism of International Investment Agreements
1. Unequal Bargaining Power
With the recognition of FDI’s importance as a significant
means of financing development, many developing countries
have worked to increase their chances of attracting
investments. 148
However, in the competition to attract
investment, developing countries are allegedly coerced into
forfeiting concerns about economic sovereignty and capital
controls in exchange for greater incentives to investors. 149
Because the market for foreign direct investment in developing
countries is competitive, potential host countries often concede
many of their rights to the investor in an effort to out bid other
competitors. 150
Consequently, the winner of the investment has typically
relinquished all possible benefits of the foreign investment
that would have aided in the development and promotion of the
welfare of their people. 151 “The benefits to the country
generated by the investment (in the form of employment,
technology transfers, tax revenues, and so on) [would] be offset
by the incentives and concessions that were needed to attract
the firm (tax breaks, reduced pollution controls, relaxed
employment regulations, and so on).” 152 Therefore, developing
countries are in a disadvantaged position when negotiating
investment agreements and are often pressured to acquiesce to
investor’s demands, gaining very little if anything from the
investment. 153
2. Broad Rights of Investors
Investors, through their superior bargaining power, are
able to successfully protect their interests during the
Thus, investment
investment agreement negotiation. 154
148. Chung, supra note 22, at 957.
149. Chung, supra note 22, at 958.
150. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639,
672 (1997–1998).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Chung, supra note 22, at 957.
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agreements have grown to impose broad obligations on the
host country thereby inviting a wide variety of investor
claims. 155 The broad, open-ended definitions included in
investment agreements subject host states to claims they did
not anticipate at the time they entered into the treaty. 156
A case is within the jurisdiction of ICSID only if both
parties consent to the Centre’s jurisdiction in writing and only
if the dispute directly arises out of an investment. 157 The
ICSID Convention, however, fails to provide any definition of
what constitutes an “investment” or “investor.” 158 In the
absence of definitions, these concepts have been given wide and
open-ended meanings and have resulted in the protection of a
variety of activities in a large number of economic fields. 159 To
interpret these terms, many ICSID tribunals turn to the
language used in the governing treaties. 160 The language
incorporated in the treaties is also commonly broad leaving
much room for interpretation by the arbitrators. 161 For
example, the U.S. Model BIT defines an investment as “every
asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly,
that has the characteristics of an investment, including such
characteristics as the commitment of capital or other
resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption
of risk.” 162
An ICSID case, Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, 163 demonstrates
the problems that can arise from an open-ended and broad
definition. In this ICSID case, the investor-claimant, Tokios
Tokelés, was a wholly owned subsidiary established in Ukraine
by a Lithuanian company. 164 When Tokios Tokelés submitted
its dispute with Ukraine to ICSID, Ukraine objected to

155. Id.
156. Id. at 960.
157. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XXV(1).
158. See generally ICSID Convention, supra note 72.
159. Chung, supra note 22, at 959.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 960.
162. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art.I, 2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf).
163. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Apr. 29, 2004), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB
/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/02/18&tab=DOC.
164. Id. at ¶ 1–2.
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jurisdiction. 165 Ukraine contended that the Tokios Tokelés was
not a foreign investor because Ukrainian nationals owned
ninety-nine percent of outstanding shares in Tokios Tokelés
and comprised two-thirds of the management. 166 However, the
Ukraine-Lithuania BIT broadly defined investor as “any entity
established in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in
conformity with its laws and regulations.” 167 Therefore,
because the Ukrainian subsidiary was incorporated under the
laws of Lithuania, the ICSID Tribunal concluded the
Lithuanian company was an investor within the meaning of
the BIT’s definition. 168 This language that both parties agreed
to in the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT is broader than the language
provided in the majority of other treaties. 169 However, this case
serves as an example of the consequences of open-ended
definitions in a treaty. 170
B. Criticism of the ICSID Arbitration System
1. Biased Tribunals
Critics allege that biased arbitrators decide investor-state
dispute settlement cases. 171 This claim that ICSID tribunals
favor investors is attributable to several features inherent in
the arbitration system.
a. Small Clique of Arbitrators
Among the hundreds of people who serve as investment
arbitrators, there exists a group of fifteen arbitrators who have
been involved in the majority of investor-state arbitration. 172
This elite group of arbitrators has the heaviest caseload as
arbitrators in investment-treaty disputes and has handled the
majority of the biggest cases in terms of award amount being
claimed. 173 The arbitrators most frequently selected to decide
165. Id. at ¶ 11.
166. Id. at ¶ 21.
167. Id. at ¶ 18.
168. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶ 71 (Apr. 29,
2004), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?
CaseNo=ARB/02/18&tab=DOC.
169. Chung, supra note 22, at 960.
170. Id.
171. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 38.
172. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 38.
173. Id.
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cases are men from developed countries. 174 Eighty-three
percent of all cases held at ICSID involve arbitrators from
Western Europe and North America and only four percent of
arbitrators are women. 175 Therefore, the concentration of cases
handled by this elite group inevitably creates a significant
career interest for these arbitrators. 176 Also, the reoccurring
use of the same arbitrators limits the possibility of diverse
viewpoints and perspectives.
b. Multiple Roles of Arbitrators
Furthermore, many of these specialists serving as
arbitrators also act as advocates in other disputes. 177 The
possibility of serving multiple roles creates a risk of conflict of
interest and raises doubts about the arbitrator’s independence
and impartiality. 178 For example, an arbitrator may be asked
to render a decision on an issue he has previously acted as an
advocate for in a prior case. 179 In these situations, an
arbitrator’s integrity might be compromised, as it is difficult
for a lawyer to remain neutral when deciding an issue in which
he has previously argued in support of one side. 180 Before the
arbitration proceedings begin, an arbitrator has a duty to
disclose any relationship with the parties or any other
circumstance that might cause doubt as to his ability to remain
impartial. 181 However, these vague disclosure obligations
permit the arbitrators to act with considerable discretion. 182
c. Lavish Arbitrator Fees
Arbitrators may lack impartiality as a result of the
significant financial interest in the existence of investment
arbitration. 183 Unlike judges, arbitrators do not earn a flat
salary and therefore have a financial stake in the arbitration
174. Id. at 36.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 35.
177. Id. at 43.
178. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 43.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 108, at R. 6(2).
182. See Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A
Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L.
53, 117 (2005).
183. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 35.
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system. 184 Arbitrators’ fees can range anywhere from $375 to
$700 per hour. 185 On average, an arbitrator earns $350,000 per
case. 186 Earnings could be far greater depending on where the
arbitration takes place, the case’s length, and the case’s
complexity. 187 ICSID has capped the amount of fees an
arbitrator can earn at $3000 per day of work. 188 However, the
fee amount an arbitrator earns on a particular case is
potentially correlated to the substantive outcome of their
decisions. 189 For example, decisions finding a lack of arbitral
jurisdiction will likely result in no fees for the arbitrator. 190
Therefore, when asked to rule on jurisdiction of the case, or
disqualify themselves due to a conflict of interest, arbitrators
are necessarily required to act contrary to their own financial
interest. 191 Disclosing a conflict of interest or narrowing the
standard of permitted cases under ICSID could result in the
loss of thousands of dollars in potential fees. 192 Accordingly,
arbitrators have a strong incentive to expand the
interpretation of investment rules to increase the number of
cases falling under ICSID jurisdiction.
d. Arbitrators Favor Investors to Promote
Investments
Because the majority of arbitrators come from developed
countries, 193 it is likely they will have a biased viewpoint
towards the corporate world thus favoring the protection of
investors’ profits. As mentioned above, arbitrators have a
significant financial interest in the arbitration system. Given
the fact that investors initiate the majority of ICSID claims,
arbitrators might strategically rule in favor of the investor to
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The World Bank Group, Memorandum on the Fees and Expenses of ICSID
Arbitrators, WORLDBANK.ORG (July 6, 2005), https://icsid.worldbank.org
/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Pages/—Memorandum-on-the-Fees-and-ExpensesEnglish.aspx.
189. See Rogers, supra note 182, at 71, for a description of the features in the
arbitration system which contribute to the notion that arbitrators are less
impartial than judges.
190. Id. at 72.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 36.
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promote an increased caseload. 194
Also, “the primary purpose behind the creation of ICSID
was the promotion of foreign investment.” 195 “The Report of
the Executive Directors on the Convention emphasized
promoting global economic development through private
international investment.” 196 Therefore, under the belief that
protecting foreign investments would facilitate investment
flows and enhance economic development in Third World
countries, 197 arbitrators have an incentive to favor the
protection of investors’ rights to encourage the growth of
international investment.
e. Inadequate Qualification Requirements
Under the current rules, a person is qualified to be an
arbitrator if they possess a “high moral character and
recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry
or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent
judgment.” 198 To be qualified as an arbitrator, a person is not
required to be registered anywhere or possess any legal
training. 199 This provision was written to ensure arbitrators
met the necessary qualifications envisioned for commercial
However, as public interests have become
disputes. 200
increasingly prevalent in international law, other legal
disputes commonly arise out of an investment. 201 ICSID
arbitrators are therefore not always qualified to address
human rights and environmental questions arising out of an
investment dispute. 202
2. Lack of Transparency
One of the most controversial aspects of international
arbitration is the confidential protection afforded to parties

194. Id. at 38.
195. ICSID Report, supra note 61, ¶ 12.
196. Charity L. Goodman, Unchartered Waters: Financial Crisis and
Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA J. INT’L ECON. L. 449, 457
(2007).
197. ICSID Report, supra note 61, ¶ 12.
198. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XIV(1).
199. Id.
200. Odumosu, supra note 58, at 382.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 382–83.
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before ICSID. 203 ICSID arbitration is a matter of contract
between the parties involved in the dispute. 204 Therefore, it is
arguably reasonable for the parties involved in the proceedings
to assume that the public should be excluded from the
proceedings. 205 Accordingly, the ICSID Arbitration Rules
create a presumption in favor of confidentiality. 206
There are some arguments to support the concept of
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings.
By choosing
arbitration as opposed to judicial proceedings, parties have
thereby rejected public courts and have elected to keep their
dispute private. 207 One of the primary reasons parties claim
they elect to settle their dispute through arbitration is the
Therefore,
rescinding
confidentiality
protection. 208
confidentiality is potentially detrimental to the arbitration
process, as arbitration proceedings would inevitably become
more like traditional litigation. 209 Also, many foreign investors
claim, “that confidentiality is necessary to protect intellectual
property, trade secrets, or business information that may be
disclosed as part of the arbitration proceedings.” 210 Investors
argue that removing confidentiality protections would cause
public disclosure of private technical data. 211
However, while confidentiality does provide some benefits
to investor-state dispute resolution, there are also several
arguments for transparency in investment arbitration
proceedings. First, confidentiality protects the arbitrators by
concealing the proceedings and award from public scrutiny. 212
This lack of historical information about each arbitrator
hinders the parties from selecting the most appropriate and
qualified arbitrator for the particular dispute in question. 213
Also, without access to prior award information, there is no
precedent, thereby making it difficult for the parties to predict

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 121, at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 54.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id.
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the outcome of their dispute. 214 “When awards are not
published, it is difficult to analyze how the law is applied.” 215
International arbitrators may therefore be applying the law
inconsistently creating an uncertainty in international
business transactions. 216
Because the “lack of transparency . . . inhibits the creation
of precedent in international law,” arbitral proceedings are
arguably less efficient. 217 For example, a party is more likely
to settle if the outcome of the dispute was more predictable. 218
Furthermore, the unpredictability of international business
transactions complicates business planning when considering
investment in a particular country. 219 Businesses pursuing
international investment are unable to accurately set prices
and allocate risk without any certainty as to the law governing
their particular deal. 220
Even though a tribunal’s award would not carry
precedential value, the case would carry persuasive weight
with other arbitral tribunals resolving similar claims. 221
However, the process of arbitration is not intended to apply
beyond only the particular facts and circumstances of the
instant case. 222 Parties consenting to arbitration have chosen
this method despite the lack of predictability that may be
afforded in a court decision with more developed bodies of
law. 223
Critics allege that the confidentiality rules of ICSID harm
the legitimacy of the institution itself. 224 Because of ICSID’s
structure and association with the World Bank, parties may be
skeptical of the tribunal’s reliability in rendering an objective
decision given the Bank’s close relations with large
corporations. 225 The “requirement that an award [shall] not be
published without the consent of the parties will limit the
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 62.
Id.
Id.
Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 62.
Id.
Id. at 63.
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public’s access to the award and contribute to the mystification
of ICSID.” 226 Parties new to the ICSID convention may
attribute “ICSID’s reluctance to publish awards . . . to the
unreliability of the tribunals’ decisions.” 227 This uncertainty
concerning the integrity of the process could weaken public
acceptance of arbitral tribunals’ awards and operations. 228
Additionally, investor-state disputes, compared to
traditional international commercial arbitration, justify the
need for transparency for the arbitration proceedings and
award.
Unlike traditional international commercial
arbitrations, investor-state disputes involve governments as
parties. The confidentiality protections might limit scrutiny of
“Democratically elected
government decision-making. 229
governments are accountable to their electorate and should
come under scrutiny in the political process if they are engaged
in conduct contrary to their international obligations.” 230
Investor-state disputes involve issues that must be decided in
accordance with a treaty or public international law. 231 The
results of these decisions could potentially have a significant
effect extending beyond the two parties involved in the dispute.
Therefore, it is inappropriate to conduct confidential
arbitrations involving public interests. 232
Moreover, confidential awards could “undermine, and
perhaps even reverse . . . legislative victories that have
provid[ed] legal protection for the rights of these
communities.” 233 As discussed above, foreign direct investment
is important for economic development in developing
countries. 234 Therefore, the government’s need to maintain a
reputation as an attractive environment for foreign investors
inevitably weakens the government’s bargaining power. 235
Thus, investors who take advantage of weaker national
226. Benjamin H. Tahyar, Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration after AMCO
Asia Corp. v. Indonesia: Watchword or White Elephant?, 10 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
93, 116 (1986).
227. Id. at 116–17.
228. Id. at 116.; Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 64.
229. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 65.
230. Id. at 64.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 64–65.
233. Id. at 65–66.
234. See supra Background Part I.
235. Id. at 65.
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governments could potentially abuse the process.
Lastly, confidential proceedings may be used to conceal
any abuse of the system by foreign governments. 236 “In the
past six years, the World Bank received more than 2,000
allegations of corruption and found a ‘recurring pattern of
bribery, kickbacks, front companies, and shell companies.’” 237
Confidential arbitration proceedings, in an environment where
the risk of corruption is allegedly prevalent, raise the
possibility of illegal practices and fraud between governments
and foreign companies. 238 Critics argue that investors are able
to use their rights to conspire with governments to force
“dangerous investments on unwilling populations.” 239
For example, in the case of Metalclad v. Mexico, 240
Metalclad Corporation, an American waste disposal company,
filed a complaint with ICSID alleging that the Mexican state
of San Luis Potosí violated provisions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement. The Governor of San Luis Potosi
prohibited Metalclad’s waste disposal plant after an
environmental impact assessment revealed that the Metalclad
facility site was an ecologically sensitive zone. 241 Accordingly,
Metalclad claimed that the Governor’s action expropriated
Metalclad’s future profits, resulting in ninety million dollars in
However, the Mexican federal government
damages. 242
allegedly encouraged Metalclad to pursue arbitration before
ICSID in order to “‘force’ the government to open a waste
disposal plant opposed by environmentalists.” 243
236. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 68.
237. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 68 DOC 37 (quoting Edward T.
Pound & Danielle Knight, Cleaning Up the World Bank, U.S. & NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Apr., 3, 2006).
238. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 68.
239. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 69.
240. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), Waste
Disposal Enterprise, (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0181.pdf.
241. Global Trade Watch, Public Citizen, Our Future Under the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment,
http://www.citizen.org/trade/article_redirect.cfm?ID=1175 (last visited Apr. 19,
2015).
242. Id.
243. See Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 123, at 68 (citing FIONA BEVERIDGE,
THE TREATMENT AND TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (2000)) DOC 43; see also Global Trade Watch, Public
Citizen, Our Future Under the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
http://www.citizen.org/trade/article_redirect.cfm?ID=1175 (last visited Dec. 30,
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Therefore, even though there are some benefits to
maintaining confidentiality in arbitration proceedings, greater
transparency is necessary for arbitration proceedings where
the government is a party, as in all arbitrations before ICSID.
Accordingly, the confidentiality rules of ICSID inappropriately
permit private arbitrations to be conducted for claims
involving public interests and harm the legitimacy of the
ICSID institution.
3. Inequitable and Excessive Award
As investors continue to be successful in securing
monetary awards through the arbitration process, the number
of cases is rising significantly. 244 “In 70% of the public
decisions addressing the merits of the dispute, investors’
claims were accepted, at least in part.” 245
The prospect of winning excessive awards encourages
investors to file claims under ICSID. Accordingly, the vast
majority of new cases filed in 2012 were filed by investors from
developed countries against developing countries. 246 In CME
Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, 247 the investor was
awarded significantly more than the actual value of the
investment. 248 In this case, the tribunal held that the Czech
Republic violated the Czech-Netherlands BIT when the
government amended their media regulatory controls. 249 The
tribunal then declared that the Czech Republic was
responsible for CME’s losses and awarded the investor over
$270 million. 250 This award amount was calculated using a
2013).
244. See Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment
Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16
FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 306 (2004).
245. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Recent
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), No. 1, at 1 (May 28–
29, 2013) [hereinafter Recent Developments in ISDS], available at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf.
246. Recent Developments in ISDS, supra note 245, at 1.
247. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award) (separate
opinion of Ian Brownlie), UNCITRAL Award, 2003 WL 24070172 ¶ 74 (Mar. 14,
2003).
248. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment
Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 465, 496 (2005).
249. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award) (separate
opinion of Ian Brownlie), UNCITRAL Award, 2003 WL 24070172 ¶ 74 (Mar. 14,
2003).
250. Id.
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discounted cash flow, which included the value of the investor’s
actual investment, as well as forecasted cash flows. 251 The
tribunal’s decision placed a high financial cost on the Czech
government to regain authority to enact new regulatory
controls. 252 Therefore, the investor’s award is often arguably
inequitable as it not only prohibits a state from regulating key
domestic affairs, but also potentially subjects the state to
paying excessive monetary awards. 253
4. ICSID Annulment Mechanism
There has been an emerging trend toward challenging
international arbitration awards. 254 As mentioned above,
ICSID offers its own system of review by which a party can
annul an award. 255 However, annulment proceedings review
only the legitimacy of the decision’s process. 256 Unlike an
appeal, an annulment does not review the substantive validity
of the award rendered. 257 Therefore, there is currently no cure
for an award decided on a substantively invalid basis.
While most states have complied with ICSID awards, in
recent years, some states, including Argentina, Congo and
Zimbabwe, have refused to comply with an award. 258 Several
procedural issues result from the States’ failure to comply with
ICSID awards, which undermines “the value of ICSID
arbitration as a meaningful mechanism for the resolution of
investment disputes.” 259
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. Modifications to Investment Agreements
Investor rights and protections applied in investment
251. Id.
252. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment
Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 465, 496 (2005).
253. Id.
254. Charles B. Rosenberg, The Intersection of International Trade and
International Arbitration: Suspending Trade Benefits to “Encourage” Compliance
with ICSID Awards, Transnational Dispute Management, Oct. 2013, at 4.
255. See ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. LII(1).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Rosenberg, supra note 254.
259. Id. at 5 (citing Siemens AG. v. Argentine Republic, United States
Submission regarding Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/8, (May 1, 2008), at 1).
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dispute settlements are most commonly established in
investment agreements. 260 Therefore, to change the investorstate arbitration regime, it is necessary to first amend
investment agreements to reconcile the business interests of
foreign investors with the economic and sustainable
development concerns of host countries. 261 As mentioned
above, investment agreements were historically created to
provide foreign investors greater protection in foreign states. 262
However, recent evidence negates the reason for developing
countries to join investment treaties. 263 The presumed benefit
of foreign direct investments for developing countries to aid in
economic development has not been materializing because
developing countries are pressured into negotiating broad
investment liberalization rights. 264
Furthermore, these developing countries have been
exposing themselves to the increased risks of international
arbitrations. 265 Therefore, investment treaties must make a
fundamental shift to diminish the focus on investor rights and
to expressly endorse sustainable development as the broader
The purpose of the
goal of investment agreements. 266
investment regime must be altered to recognize that states
have a right to pursue investments that ensure a positive
contribution to their sustainable development. 267
To make this shift, investment agreements must expressly
endorse sustainable development as a goal of the investment
agreement, as opposed to only referring to the investor’s rights
and protections. 268 Including a binding obligation on the part
of the foreign investor to protect human rights and the
environment will transform the scope of the treaty to promote
sustainable development. 269 This shift in focus within the
investment agreement will create a more balanced approach
that recognizes state rights and responsibilities within the

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Wick, supra note 145, at 289.
Id.
Mann, supra note 20, at 524.
Id. at 531.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 537.
Mann, supra note 20, at 537.
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presence of investor rights. 270
Currently, many investment agreements rely on vague
terms, which are broadly interpreted to afford investors’
expansive rights. 271 Investment treaties should therefore be
amended to limit the scope of investors’ rights by using clear,
definitive language. The terms “investor” and “investment”
should be clearly defined within the investment agreement to
refer only to investments made by the particular private
investor from one state within a foreign host state. 272
Narrowing the definitions of these terms will limit the
arbitrator’s ability to widely interpret the scope of the
investment agreement. 273 Ultimately, this clarification will
prevent investors from enforcing broad obligations on the host
state and will reduce the risk to the host state by preventing a
wide variety of unforeseeable investor claims.
B. Reform the ICSID Arbitration Process
In April 2006, ICSID made some limited changes to its
arbitration rules. 274 These amendments demonstrate that it is
possible for ICSID to make the necessary adjustments to meet
the evolving needs of investors and host countries. While these
changes were a step in the right direction, there have not been
any additional changes to ICSID since 2006. 275 The ICSID
Administrative Council has the authority to amend ICSID
Rules. 276 Any revision must be consistent with the ICSID
Convention and must be approved by a majority of two-thirds
vote by the Administrative Council. 277 With the growth of
international investment agreements and the resulting growth
of investor-state arbitrations, additional changes to the
arbitration process are necessary to increase legitimacy and
deter other countries from withdrawing from the ICSID
Convention.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 538.
273. Id.
274. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 26.
275. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 108, at 5.
276. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. LXV.
277. See NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, LISE JOHNSON & FIONA
MARSHALL, ARBITRATOR INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY: EXAMINING THE
DUAL ROLE OF ARBITRATOR AND COUNSEL 43 (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. ed.,
2011).
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Arbitrator’s

As mentioned above, a small clique of arbitrators typically
decides
investor-state
dispute
settlement
cases. 278
Accordingly, the arbitrator’s potential conflict of interest and
extravagant fees, undermines the arbitrator’s ability to make
an unbiased and neutral decision. The ICSID Arbitration
Rules stipulating the required qualifications of the arbitrators
should be revised to increase legitimacy and promote mutual
confidence in the system.
The ICSID Arbitration Rules should be amended to
include more stringent restrictions regarding conflicts of
interest.
The disclosure obligations stated in ICSID’s
Arbitration Rules should list specific categories of information
subject to disclosure by the arbitrator. 279 For example, the rule
should explicitly require disclosure of any social relationships
between the arbitrator and lawyer, as well as any previous
disputes in which the arbitrator was involved in with either
party. 280 The rule should also prohibit lawyers from crossing
over roles as arbitrators in some disputes and advocates in
other disputes. An independent and transparent tribunal
should solve investment disputes. 281
Additionally, Article 14 of the ICSID Convention, which
addresses the required qualifications and knowledge of an
arbitrator, should be revised to require that arbitrators be
persons of recognized competence in the fields of both
Arbitrators
environmental and human rights law. 282
possessing the expertise to address public interest disputes
arising out of investments would enhance ICSID’s
effectiveness and promote “mutual confidence” within the
system.
2. Increase Transparency
Because the decisions of investor-state disputes could have
significant impacts on broad public welfare issues, it is not
appropriate for such cases to be resolved in privatized
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See supra Analysis Part III.
Id. at 44.
Rogers, supra note 182, at 118.
EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 72.
Odumosu, supra note 58, at 382.
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commercial arbitration. While the 2006 amendments to the
ICSID Convention Rules improved transparency by permitting
third parties to attend hearings and publication of the award,
both of the new rules are dependent upon consent of the
parties. 283 In cases involving public interests, tribunals should
be required to hold open hearings, disclose documents, and
accept amicus briefs.
Also, prior awards do not bind a tribunal, which creates
the potential for contrasting results for the same issue. 284 The
lack of uniformity introduces a higher risk to both parties and
ultimately threatens the legitimacy of ICSID. 285 Increasing
transparency will facilitate in the creation of precedent thereby
allowing parties to more adequately set prices to allocate risk.
Therefore, a system of precedent should be introduced to
prevent inconsistencies and create a more predictable and
apparently fair outcome.
3. Create an Appeals Process
While an award can be annulled for procedural
inefficiencies, there is currently no recourse for rulings that are
The current
substantively flawed or inconsistent. 286
annulment process is not able to reconcile any legal errors
made in the resolution process. 287 An appellate system should
be created to permit the correction of legal errors “which might
otherwise inappropriately bankrupt developing nations, stifle
legitimate regulatory activity, or deprive investors of their
legitimate expectations.” 288
4. Promote Mutual Confidence
As foreign investors have initiated the vast majority of
ICSID cases against developing countries, it is evident that
283. ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulations, Reg.22, (Mar. 18,
1965),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
284. Eric David Kasenetz, Note, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures:
The Aftermath of Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight in the
ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 709, 735.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 734.
287. Id.
288. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1625 (2004–2005).
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ICSID has successfully fulfilled its promise of affording greater
investment protection. 289 Although it is difficult to determine
whether ICSID successfully contributed to increasing
investment flow, it is evident ICSID tribunals have prioritized
investment protections as they have predominantly engaged in
settling disputes with foreign investors as claimants. 290 While
it is important to protect foreign investment to promote foreign
investment flow, it is equally important to ensure the
investment has a positive effect on the enhancement of the
Therefore, ICSID should
Third World’s development. 291
concentrate on promoting “mutual confidence,” as this is a
necessary element to maintain ICSID’s relevancy in
developing countries. To encourage “mutual confidence,”
ICSID must consider ways to address the needs of the Third
World. 292
5. Broaden the Investment Dispute Scope to
Include Public Interest Analysis
Since ICSID’s inception over forty years ago, international
law has continuously changed and developed. 293 International
environmental law and human rights have evolved into a
prominent area of international law today. 294 Therefore,
ICSID should consider extending the ICSID Convention’s
scope of review to issues of international public interests. 295
ICSID tribunals should not refrain from considering
developing countries’ interests if they constitute a “legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment” as stipulated by
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. 296 Addressing these
issues, such as human rights, economic development or
environmental issues, in the tribunal’s evaluation of the legal
investment dispute would enhance ICSID’s legitimacy and
encourage
international
cooperation
for
economic
297
development.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Odumosu, supra note 58, at 362.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
Odumosu, supra note 58, at 350.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
The significant increase in the number of disputes within
ICSID jurisdiction based on international investment
agreements confirms the legitimacy of the investor-state
dispute mechanism. However, even though the number of
cases initiated by developing countries increased in 2012, the
majority of investment disputes originated from developed
countries. Given the arguments that the current international
investment regime favors investors, amendments should be
made to the international investment agreements and the
ICSID Convention to establish mutual confidence of both
investors and states that will stimulate foreign investment and
enhance economic development.

